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The Silent Treatment: Removing the
Class Action From the Plaintiff's
Toolbox Without Ever Saying a Word
Bazzle v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.
I. INTRODUCTION
A motion for class certification is often a pivotal point in a lawsuit, playing a
determinative role throughout the course of the litigation. Plaintiffs use the class
action as a tool to consolidate common claims against a defendant, bypassing the
expensive process of bringing suit individually. 2  Defendants hotly contest
certification of the class, seeking to avoid the ramifications of a judgment which
reflects the cumulative losses of the multitude. This casenote addresses the
effects of allowing an arbitration clause that is silent as to class-wide arbitration to
preclude the plaintiffs' option to bring suit as a class, and the South Carolina
Supreme Court's decision in Bazzle to protect consumers from this restrictive kind
of treatment.
II. FACTS AND HOLDING
In separate class action suits, Lynn and Burt Bazzle 4 and Daniel Lackey 5 sued
Green Tree Financial Corporation 6 alleging violations of the attorney and
insurance agent preference provision of the South Carolina Consumer Protection
Code.7 After separate arbitration hearings conducted by the same arbitrator, the
South Carolina Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction and consolidated the appeals,
finding that the cases presented the same issue.
1. 569 S.E.2d 349 (S.C. 2002), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003).
2. See Jean R. Stemlight, As Mandatory Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class
Action Survive?, 42 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 1, 29-30 (Oct. 2000) (noting that class actions have been
praised for their efficiency in "that they allow issues involving multiple persons or institutions to be
resolved more cheaply and expeditiously").
3. See Alan S. Kaplinsky & Mark J. Levin, Excuse Me, But Who's the Predator? Banks Can Use
Arbitration Clauses as a Defense, 7 Bus. L. Today 24, 25 (May/June 1998) (also indicating that
arbitration serves to deter class actions as these types of lawsuits are reduced substantially if
consumers have agreed with lenders to arbitrate their disputes).
4. Lynn and Burt Bazzle are private homeowners who contracted with Green Tree Financial
Corporation for home improvements financing.
5. Daniel Lackey is an individual mobile home purchaser who entered into a pre-printed
installment contract/security agreement with Green Tree for the purchase of a mobile home.
6. Green Tree Financial Corporation is a corporation providing various financial services to
consumers nationwide, including home equity loans, manufactured housing loans, and home
improvement loans. Conseco Finance Servicing Corp, Conseco StepUp <http://www.gtfc.com>
(accessed Feb. 13, 2003).
7. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-10-102, 37-10-105 (2002).
1
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A. Bazzle Case
In 1995, the Bazzles were approached by Patton General Contracting, a
non-exclusive Green Tree dealer, to perform home improvements.' Patton
provided them with a Green Tree financing application; this application did not
contain an attorney or insurance agent preference notice. 9 The Bazzles executed a
Retail Installment Contract and Security Agreement for $15,000 on May 20,
1995.0 Green Tree was identified as the lender on the financing documents, and
the Bazzles were directed to return the signed papers to Green Tree." During the
course of the contract dealings, neither Green Tree nor its agent presented the
Bazzles with an attorney or insurance preference form, and the Bazzles did not
employ an attorney to oversee the transaction or closing.12
In March of 1997, the Bazzles filed suit in the Dorchester County Court of
Common Pleas against Green Tree alleging violations of the attorney and
insurance agent preference provisions of the South Carolina Consumer Protection
Code. 13 In April, the Bazzles filed to amend the complaint to incorporate class
allegations and moved for class certification. 14  Pursuant to the arbitration
agreement in the contract, Green Tree filed a Motion for Stay and to Compel
Arbitration. 15 On December 5, 1997, the trial court granted class certification;
following the ruling, Green Tree pursued and was granted its motion to compel
arbitration.' 6 In its order compelling arbitration, the trial court stated that the
ruling applied to the Bazzles and all who elected to be part of the class action. 17
In 1998, Green Tree filed several motions in an effort to disband the class.
Following the trial court's denial of Green Tree's Motion for Reconsideration of
the order certifying the class, the court of appeals dismissed Green Tree's appeal
of the issue as interlocutory and denied rehearing on the issue.' 8 The South
Carolina Supreme Court denied certiorari and remitted the case to the trial court.' 9
In February 1999, the Bazzles filed a Motion to Compel Appointment of an
Arbitrator. 0 In May, Green Tree filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the
Bazzles were not proper class representatives, because their interests were
contrary to those of the class members.2' On May 20, 1999, the trial court
appointed the Honorable Thomas Ervin as arbitrator and declined to hear Green
Tree's motion to dismiss. 22 From that point on, the class action proceedings were




12. Id. The South Carolina Consumer Protection Code requires dealers to provide consumers with
these forms. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-10-102, 37-10-105.
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heard and conducted by the arbitrator, without further involvement of the trial
court. On July 24, 2000, the arbitrator issued a Final Order and Award, finding
Green Tree liable for violating the attorney and insurance preference provisions of
the South Carolina Consumer Protection Act. 23 The Bazzle class was awarded
$10,935,000 in damages, $3,645,500 in attorneys' fees, and $18,242 in costs. 24 On
September 15, 2000, the trial court confirmed the award and denied Green Tree's
25
motions to remand and vacate. Green Tree appealed and the South Carolina
26Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction from the appellate court to hear the appeal.
B. Lackey Case
Through a Green Tree dealer, Daniel Lackey and class members entered into
preprinted consumer installment contracts and security agreements with Green
Tree for the purchase of mobile homes. 27 In each transaction, the consumer
completed necessary application materials through a Green Tree dealer.28 As in
Bazzle, these applications did not contain an attorney or insurance preference
29
notice and no such form was provided to them at any time during the transaction.
As a result, in May 1996, Daniel Lackey and George and Florine Buggs
commenced a class action suit against Green Tree in the Barnwell County Court
of Common Pleas, alleging the violations of the attorney and insurance preference
provisions of the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code.
Green Tree filed its answer, and Lackey subsequently filed a Motion for Class
Certification.3' Green Tree filed a Motion to Stay and to Compel Arbitration.32
The trial court found that Green Tree's contract was an adhesion contract with an
unconscionable arbitration clause and denied the motion to compel.33 On appeal,
the Court of Appeals agreed that the contracts were ones of adhesion, but found
the arbitration clause to be conscionable and remanded the case.34 The parties
entered into a Consent Order appointing the Honorable Thomas Ervin as arbitrator
following remand.35
The arbitrator raised the issue of class arbitration, and in considering the
plaintiffs motion for class certification, held a hearing to determine if class action
36arbitration could proceed under Green Tree's arbitration clause. The parties
disputed the substance of Green Tree's arguments at this hearing. The Lackey
class claimed that Green Tree wanted the arbitrator to decide that the class action
23. Id.
24. Id. at 353.
25. Id.
26. Id. The South Carolina Supreme Court found that the Bazzle case was sufficiently similar to
another class action suit, Lackey, to consolidate them on appeal. Id. at 354.
27. Id. at 353.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-10-102, 37-10-105.
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could not proceed in arbitration. 37 Green Tree claimed that it challenged the
arbitrator's authority to order class action arbitration, basing its contentions on the
Federal Arbitration Act. 38  After the hearing, "the arbitrator issued an order
permitting class action arbitration and scheduled a class certification hearing.,
39
In September 1998, Green Tree sought a declaratory judgment from the
federal district court to enjoin the arbitrator from hearing the issue of class
certification.4" The district court denied the injunction and dismissed the
declaratory judgment action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. 4 At the class
certification hearing in November, with Green Tree's counsel present but not
participating, the arbitrator found that class certification requirements had been
met.42  Green Tree then petitioned in state court for a Motion to Stay the
arbitration proceedings, a declaratory judgment, and a preliminary injunction.43
The trial court denied the stay, citing lack of jurisdiction to interfere with the
arbitration. 4
At the arbitrator's pre-trial conference, the parties consented to redefine the
Lackey class to include all mobile home transactions and moved all home
improvement class members into the Bazzle class. 5 In March 2000, the Lackey
arbitration took place, with full participation by Green Tree.46 At the conclusion
of the arbitration, the arbitrator ruled that Green Tree had violated the attorney and
insurance preference provisions and awarded the plaintiffs $9,200,000 in
damages, $3,066,666 in attorneys' fees, and $18,252 in CoStS. 47 In May, the same
arbitrator decided the Bazzle claims and set out a procedure for Green Tree to
offset its claims between the two classes.48 The Lackey class then moved to
confirm the award in the trial court.49 Green Tree filed a Motion to Remand and a
Motion to Vacate the award.5 ° In December 2001, the trial court confirmed the
award and Green Tree appealed. 51
The South Carolina Supreme Court withdrew the appeal from the South
Carolina Court of Appeals and assumed jurisdiction to hear the consolidated
Bazzle and Lackey appeals. 52 Furthermore, the court found that Green Tree did
not waive its ability to object to class-wide arbitration by manifesting consent to
the class-wide arbitration, because it had vigorously fought certification prior to

















53. Id. at 355.
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it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in prejudice., 54 The
court upheld the Bazzle and Lackey awards, holding that the arbitrator acted
properly regarding the issue of class certification since the law was unsettled at
the time of the proceedings.55
The United States Supreme Court granted certiorari on January 10, 2003.56
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND
Until recently, class action proceedings and arbitration were mutually
exclusive concepts. As the two concepts have merged, federal courts have
presented a unified front, agreeing that absent an express agreement allowing
class-wide arbitration, the plaintiffs may not proceed as a class in arbitration, but
must pursue their claims individually.57 State courts, on the other hand, are split
on the issue.58 This disagreement is not a surprising result considering that courts
have had little guidance from Congress; neither the Federal Arbitration Act
("FAA")59 nor the Uniform Arbitration Act ("UAA") 6° addresses the relationship
between the two.
6 1
Although the United States Supreme Court had the chance to address the
issue of the applicability of the FAA to class actions in Southland Corp. v.
62 63Keating,62 it declined to do so, leaving the circuits to their own interpretations.
Despite this lack of guidance, the federal courts have addressed the issue with
strikingly similar results.
The first federal case to address the issue of class-wide arbitration was
Gammaro v. Thorp Consumer Discount Co.,64 a suit in which plaintiff brought a
class action claim under the Truth in Lending Act alleging that the defendant
improperly refused to allow him to rescind a consumer loan. 5 In its decision, the
Minnesota District Court focused on the language of Section 4 of the FAA,66 and
54. Id. at 360.
55. Id. at 361-62.
56. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 123 S. Ct. 817 (2003).
57. See infra n. 70 (reflecting the notion that where the arbitration agreement or applicable
procedural rules do not permit class action, arbitral class action is not an option).
58. See Med. Ctr. Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 S.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998) (refusing to recognize class-wide
arbitration based on its duty to follow the parties' agreement, which did not expressly allow class-
arbitration); But see Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc., 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 1991)
(allowing class-wide arbitration in an action under the FAA, finding that contract language covering
"any controversy" was in accord with the state's public policy favoring arbitration).
59. 9 U.S.C. § I et seq. (2000).
60. UAA §§ 1-25, 7 U.L.A. 1 (1997).
61. Stemlight, supra n. 2, at 15-16.
62. 465 U.S. 1 (1984).
63. Id. at 17.
64. 828 F. Supp. 673 (D. Minn. 1993).
65. Id. at 673.
66. Id. at 674. The pertinent part of § 4 states:
A party aggrieved by the alleged failure, neglect, or refusal of another to arbitrate under a written
agreement for arbitration may petition any United States district court.., for an order directing
that such arbitration proceed in the manner provided for in such agreement .... [T]he court shall
make an order directing the parties to proceed to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the
agreement.... [T]he court shall make an order summarily directing the parties to proceed with
the arbitration in accordance with the terms thereof.
9 U.S.C. § 4. (emphasis added).
20031
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held that "the court shall make an order directing the parties to proceed to
arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.,67 The court further
relied on an analogy to an Eighth Circuit case involving consolidation of
arbitration proceedings, 68 and found that despite the differences between
consolidation and class certification, the principles were sufficiently similar to
apply the same reasoning; absent an express provision allowing class arbitration,
parties would be bound to proceed individually.f9
Since the Gammaro decision, federal courts have faced the issue in a number
of different contexts, although they have rarely been inclined to address the issue
directly. In dicta or footnote commentary, most courts assume that where the
arbitration agreement or applicable procedural rules do not permit class action,
arbitral class action is not an option.70
In Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.,7 1 the United States Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit set forth the standard attitude for arbitration clauses that are silent
regarding class actions by drawing an analogy to the consolidation of arbitration
proceedings. 72 The Second, Fifth, Sixth, Eighth, Ninth and Eleventh Circuits had
previously decided that when the arbitration agreement was silent as to
consolidation, "the duty to rigorously enforce arbitration agreements 'in
accordance with the terms thereof' as set forth in Section 4 of the FAA bars
district courts from applying Rule 42(a)73 to require consolidated arbitration.,
74
67. Gammaro, 828 F. Supp. at 674.
68. Baesler v. Continental Grain Co., 900 F.2d 1193 (8th Cir. 1990).
69. Gammaro, 828 F. Supp. at 674.
70. See McCarthy, 1994 WL 387852 at *8 (citing to Gammaro and holding that "the court cannot
compel arbitration on a class basis where the agreement did not specifically provide for it"); Sims v.
Unicor Mortg., Inc., 1998 WL 34016832 at *3 (N.D. Miss. Apr. 27, 1998) (noting in dicta that "the
provision prohibiting class action claims does not violate public policy. There is no public policy
favoring class actions."); Howard v. Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler, 977 F. Supp. 654, 665 n. 7
(S.D.N.Y. 1997) (stating in a footnote that an employee that agrees to "arbitrate all claims arising out
of her employment may not avoid arbitration by pursuing class claims. Such claims must be pursued
in non-class arbitration."); Application of Deiulemar Compagnia Di Navigazione S.p.A. v. M/V
Allegra, 198 F.3d 473, 481-82 (4th Cir. 1999) (endorsing the "in accordance with the terms of the
agreement" reasoning set forth in Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1999)); Johnson
v. West Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 377 n. 4 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating in a footnote that "[tihis court
has never addressed the question whether class actions can be pursued in arbitral forums, though it
appears impossible to do so unless the arbitration agreement contemplates such a procedure."); Iowa
Grain Co. v. Brown, 171 F.3d 504, 510 (7th Cir. 1999) (affirming the district court's decision which
reasoned in dicta that "the kind of class action contemplated by Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b) is normally
unavailable in arbitration.").
71. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995).
72. Id. at 274.
73. Fed. R. Civ. P. 42(a) (1999) provides that "[wihen actions involving a common question of law
or fact are pending before the court, it may order a joint hearing or trial of any or all the matters in
issue in the actions; it may order all the actions consolidated; and it may make such orders concerning
proceedings therein as may tend to avoid unnecessary costs or delay."
74. Champ, 55 F.3d at 274. See Govt. of United Kingdom of Great Britain v. Boeing Co., 998 F.2d
68, 74 (2d Cir. 1993); Del E. Webb Constr. v. Richardson Hosp. Auth., 823 F.2d 145, 150 (5th Cir.
1987); Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Natl. Cas. Co., 951 F.2d 107, 108 (6th Cir. 1991); Baesler, 900 F.2d
at 1195; Weyerhaeuser Co. v. W. Seas Ship. Co., 743 F.2d 635, 637 (9th Cir. 1984); Protective Life Ins.
Corp. v. Lincoln Natl. Life Ins. Corp., 873 F.2d 281, 282 (11 th Cir. 1989). Recently, the Third Circuit
echoed the majority view in dicta in Johnson, 225 F.3d at 377 n. 4. In contrast, the First Circuit held
that where the underlying state arbitration law specifically allows consolidation, silence in the
agreement does not prevent it. New Eng. Energy, Inc. v. Keystone Ship. Co., 855 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir.
1988).
6
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/13
Silent Treatment
The Seventh Circuit applied this reasoning to arbitration, finding "no meaningful
basis to distinguish between the failure to provide for consolidated arbitration and
class arbitration., 75 The court's decision has been echoed by numerous courts
facing the issue.76
State courts differ on the subject of how to treat the issue of class arbitration.
Some have found the federal court analogy to consolidation to be persuasive.
77
New Jersey, Maryland, and South Carolina courts have rejected the federal view
and hold that consolidation of arbitration proceedings is appropriate where the
agreement is silent.78 The analogy between consolidation and arbitration may
foreshadow how courts in the future will treat the issue of class-action arbitration
when faced with the issue.
79
Several state courts have also refused to compel class arbitration. When
weighing the options of arbitration and class action, these courts retain the view
that arbitration and class actions are incompatible. In an unpublished opinion, a
Delaware Chancery Court barred the plaintiff's unsupported argument for class
arbitration, saying that the "contract provides for arbitration under specific and
well-established rules that, insofar as this record shows, do not provide for class
arbitration., 80 Another Delaware court compelled arbitration while recognizing it
would be the demise of the class claim. 8' In New York, a supreme court decision
compelled arbitration of the named-plaintiffs only, thus breaking up the class
action.
82
In 1998, the Alabama Supreme Court refused to recognize class-wide
arbitration based on its duty to follow the parties' agreement, which did not
expressly allow class-arbitration.83 In another case, the court stated that
"[airbitration agreements cannot be forced into the mold of class-action treatment
without defeating the parties' contractual rights; a rule of civil procedure providing
for class actions cannot overcome binding arbitration agreements.
84
75. Champ, 55 F.3d at 275.
76. See Gammaro, 828 F. Supp. at 674 (finding arbitration and consolidation similar enough to
apply class action treatment in the same manner).
77. See In re Cullman Ventures, Inc., 682 N.Y.S.2d 391, 395 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1998); In re
Salvano v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 647 N.E.2d 1298, 1301-02 (N.Y. 1995);
Bateman Constr., Inc. v. Haitsuka Bros., Ltd., 889 P.2d 58, 64 (Haw. 1995); Bay County Bldg. Auth. v.
Spence Bros., 362 N.W.2d 739, 742 (Mich. App. 1984); Pueblo of Laguna v. Cillessen & Son, Inc.,
682 P.2d 197, 199-200 (N.M. 1984); S.K. Barnes, Inc. v. Valiquette, 597 P.2d 941, 943-44 (Wash.
App. 1979); Consol. P. Engr. v. Greater Anchorage Area Borough Sch. Dist., 563 P.2d 252, 255
(Alaska 1977). However, the Revised UAA now allows consolidation of arbitration proceedings.
Unif. Arbitration Act § 10(c) (2000).
78. See Kalman Floor Co. v. Jos. L. Muscarelle, Inc., 481 A.2d 553, 562 (N.J. Super. App. Div.
1984), affd, 486 A.2d 334 (N.J. 1985); Litton Bionetics, Inc. v. Glen Constr. Co., 437 A.2d 208, 220
(Md. 1981); Episcopal Hous. Corp. v. Fed. Ins. Co., 255 S.E.2d 451,452 (S.C. 1979).
79. It is important to note that the Revised UAA only prohibits the consolidation of arbitration
proceedings when the agreement prohibits consolidation. UAA (2000) § 10(c), 7 U.L.A. I (Supp.
2002). As states adopt this revised version, the analogy between the class action and consolidation
may change to mirror the revision.
80. Steinberg v. Prudential-Bache Sec., 1986 WL 5024 at *5 (Del. Ch. Apr. 30, 1986).
81. Leason v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, 1984 WL 8232 at *3 (Del. Ch. Aug. 23,
1984).
82. Harris v. Shearson Hayden Stone, Inc., 441 N.Y.S. 2d 70, 74-76 (App. Div. 1st Dept. 1981).
83. Med Center Cars, Inc. v. Smith, 727 S.2d 9, 20 (Ala. 1998).
84. Exparte Green Tree Fin. Corp., 723 S.2d 6, 10 n. 3 (Ala. 1998).
2003]
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A Washington appellate court recently joined this school of thought, finding
that an arbitration clause was enforceable even though it prevented the plaintiff
from bringing a class action. 85 The court held that "[b]ecause the arbitration
clause here is silent on class action and [plaintiff] has failed to demonstrate a
conflict with statutory provisions, contract law, or due process requirements, we
enforce the clause as written. 86
There are a few state courts, however, that take the opposite position. In
Pennsylvania and Georgia, class arbitration has been treated by the courts with
favor. In Dickler v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, Inc.,87 the Pennsylvania Superior
Court allowed class-wide arbitration in an action under the FAA, finding that
contract language covering "any controversy" was in accord with the state's
public policy favoring arbitration. 88  In two separate suits in the 1970s, the
Georgia Supreme Court certified taxpayer classes that proceeded in arbitration. 89
In California, the courts have taken a decidedly pro-class action stance. In
Keating v. Super. Ct.,90 the California Supreme Court recognized the negative
implications for the consumer if barred from a class action suit:
If the right to a proceeding could be automatically eliminated in
relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of a
provision for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class action
principles, and for chilling the effective protection of interests common
to a group, would be substantial. 9'
In its decision the court discussed a unique California statute which allows
consolidation of separate arbitration proceedings under certain circumstances;
92
drawing an analogy to this statute, it allowed class arbitration.93 On appeal, the
United States Supreme Court reversed the Keating court, although its opinion did
not address the class arbitration issue.
Although California federal courts have noted the inapplicability of its state
court reasoning because of its basis in a California state statute,94 the California
Supreme Court recently reaffirmed its stance on class arbitration in Blue Cross of
Cal. v. Super. Ct.,9 5 concluding that a trial court may order classwide arbitration
"when the agreement between the parties is silent and state decisional authority
85. Stein v. Geonerco, Inc., 17 P.3d 1266, 1271 (Wash. App. Div. 1 2001).
86. Id.
87. 596 A.2d 860 (Pa. Super. 1991).
88. Id. at 866. The court also considered the fact that the arbitration clause was contained in a form
contract. Id. at 866-67. This policy to favor arbitration was also set forth by the United States
Supreme Court in Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc. v. Byrd, 470 U.S. 213, 221 (1985).
89. Boynton v. Carswell, 233 S.E.2d 185 (Ga. 1977); Callaway v. Carswell, 242 S.E.2d 103 (Ga.
1978). Although these decisions are almost 25 years old, they still stand in Georgia.
90. 645 P.2d 1192 (Cal. 1982), rev'd in part on other grounds, Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S.
1(1984).
91. Id. at 1207.
92. Id. at 1208; Cal. Civ. Code § 1281.3 (West 1982).
93. Id. at 1209.
94. See McCarthy, 1994 WL 387852 at **4-5; Hyundai Am., Inc. v. Meissner & Wurst GmbH &
Co., 26 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1219-20 (N.D. Cal. 1998).
95. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779, 794-95 (App. 1999).
8
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specifically provides for such arbitration. ' '96 The court went further to say that the
FAA "preempts state law only to the extent it stands as an obstacle to the
enforcement of contractual agreements to arbitrate. 97
IV. INSTANT DECISION
The decision in the present case arose out of a dispute between Green Tree
Financial Corporation and two separate classes of consumers bringing claims
under the South Carolina Consumer Protection Code.98 Though each class was
separately arbitrated and appealed, the South Carolina Supreme Court found that
the issues presented on appeal were sufficiently similar to allow it to assume
jurisdiction and consolidate the claims.99 Green Tree appealed the following
issues: 1) whether it waived its ability to object to class-wide arbitration by
manifesting consent to the class-wide arbitration; 2) whether the arbitrator and
trial court had contractual or legal authority to authorize class-wide arbitration;
and 3) if so, whether the due process rights of the absent class members were
protected. 100
A. Waiver
The first issue the court addressed was whether Green Tree's manifestation of
consent to class-wide arbitration waived its ability to object to it. The court
rejected plaintiffs' contentions, finding that Green Tree vigorously protested class-
wide arbitration in both cases before defending itself on the merits.'' In Bazzle,
plaintiffs argued that although Green Tree initially objected to class-wide
arbitration before the arbitrator, it subsequently waived its objection by its
actions. °2  The Lackey class argued that because Green Tree was aware of the
class allegations when it moved to compel arbitration, it consented to allowing the
arbitrator to make this decision by moving to compel arbitration without insisting
that the trial court decide the class certification issue. 1 3 The court rejected the
plaintiffs' contentions, saying that although Green Tree's efforts to decertify were
unsuccessful, they sufficiently manifested their objection to class-wide arbitration
and did not waive the objection by subsequently defending itself during the
arbitrations. 104
96. Id. at 794.
97. Id.
98. S.C. Code Ann. §§ 37-10-102, 37-10-105.
99. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 354.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 355.
102. Id. The court cites one example of such "consent." Id. The Bazzle class claimed that by
moving to decertify the class during the arbitration Green Tree manifested consent for the arbitrator to
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B. Class-Wide Arbitration
In its appeal, Green Tree argued that the trial court and arbitrator did not
enforce the arbitration clause contained in its contract in accordance with the
terms, which violated the Federal Arbitration Act. °5 Finding that the United
States Supreme Court had not addressed the issue of class-wide arbitration, the
court outlined the two current approaches. The first approach, followed by several
federal circuits, 10 6 is based on FAA Section 4 and precludes class-wide arbitration
if the arbitration agreement is silent.10 7  The second approach, followed in
California state courts, permits class-wide arbitration on a case-by-case basis
when the agreement is silent.
The court reviewed the first approach with an examination of the leading
case, Champ v. Siegel Trading Co.'0 In Champ, the Seventh Circuit supported its
decision to deny class arbitration by drawing an analogy between class-wide
arbitration and consolidation.'0 9 The court applied the rationale of other circuits
applying Section 4 of the FAA in consolidation cases and held that if the
arbitration agreement is silent as to class arbitration, class-wide arbitration is not
provided for by the terms of the agreement and cannot proceed as such." 0  The
court noted that Champ failed to discuss the differences between class-wide
arbitration and consolidation on a practical level and whether an arbitration clause
in an adhesion contract should be afforded the same treatment."'
The court then discussed the California Supreme Court's approach to class-
wide arbitration when the arbitration clause is included in an adhesion contract."1
2
Citing Southland Corp. v. Keating,1'3 the California Supreme Court spelled out
the negative implications of denying class certification in arbitration:
[Iff the right to a classwide proceeding could be automatically eliminated
in relationships governed by adhesion contracts through the inclusion of
a provision for arbitration, the potential for undercutting these class
action principles, and for chilling the effective protection of interests
common to a group, would be substantial." 
4
The Bazzle court noted that Keating also drew an analogy between class-wide
arbitration and consolidation cases, which at that time was allowed by the Second
105. Id. The parties did not dispute that the FAA applied. Id. In Munoz v. Green Tree Fin. Corp.,
542 S.E.2d 360 (S.C. 2001), the court had previously held that the arbitration clause in Green Tree's
contract was governed by the FAA. The arbitration clause at issue in the Bazzle and Lackey cases was
the same as in Munoz. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 355 n. 9.
106. Supra n. 70.
107. 9 U.S.C. § 4.
108. Champ, 55 F.3d at 269.
109. Id. at 275.
110. Id.
11l. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 356.
112. Id. at 356-57.
113. 645 P.2d 1192 (1982).
114. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 357 (quoting Keating, rev'd in part on other grounds in Southland Corp. v.
Keating, 465 U.S. I (1984)).
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Circuit.11 5 The Bazzle court maintained that although the Second Circuit had
reversed itself on the issue of consolidation, the logic in Keating still applied since
Keating also distinguished the differences between class-wide arbitration and
consolidation.' 
16
The court went on to discuss a more recent decision of the California Court of
Appeals, which not only upheld the court's ruling in Keating, but also expanded
the discussion of the applicability of Section 4 of the FAA to the class-wide
arbitration rule. 17 In Blue Cross v. Super. Ct.,118 the court held that Section 4 of
the FAA does not apply to state courts at all, reasoning that the language of
Section 4 contemplated the issue before a district court applying the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. 19 Blue Cross held that the FAA does not preempt state
precedent, since following the state precedent of allowing class-wide arbitration
would further the FAA's goal of enforcing arbitration agreements.120
C. Bazzle and Lackey
The court adopted the California approach.121 In rejecting Green Tree's
argument that its contract language limited arbitration to individuals, the court
found that the agreement was silent regarding classwide arbitration) 22 Green
Tree's first argument was essentially that their arbitration clause providing for
arbitration of "disputes, claims, or controversies arising from this contract, or the
relationships which result from this contract" limited arbitration to individual
claims because of the "this contract" language.' 23  The court found that the
agreement was silent and, at best, this language created an ambiguity to be
construed against the drafter. 1
24
Green Tree also argued that the court was obligated to follow the federal
precedent set forth in Champ, as mandated by Section 4 of the FAA. '25 The court
disagreed, holding that the Fourth Circuit had cited Champ in dicta, but had not
directly addressed the issue. 26 Furthermore, without a United States Supreme
Court ruling on the issue, precedent set by federal circuit courts was not binding
on their decision. 12  The court went on to question whether FAA Section 4
applies in state court at all, basing its uncertainty on Section 4's language that "[a]
party aggrieved by the alleged failure ... of another to arbitrate under a written
115. Id. The Second Circuit has since reversed itself on the issue and now holds that ordering
consolidation when the arbitration agreement is silent violates § 4 of the FAA. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 358.
118. 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d 779 (1998).
119. Id. at 790-91.
120. Id. at 793.
121. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360.





127. Id. at 359. The court found that when the arbitration agreement was silent as to class-wide
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agreement for arbitration may petition a United States district court.' 28 As noted
in Blue Cross,129 the language contemplates enforcement in a federal district court,
not state court.' 
30
The court further held that regardless of the FAA's impact, Green Tree's
omission of any reference to class actions could be construed against them as a
matter of contract interpretation under state law.131 In drawing the analogy to
consolidation of claims, the court also found that to prohibit class-wide arbitration
would go against the court's prior holdings, since consolidation of claims had
been permitted where appropriate. 132 Finding no South Carolina case law or
statute prohibiting class-wide arbitration, and a strong policy in favor of
arbitration, the court sided with the California courts in Keating33 and Blue
Cross,134 holding that "class-wide arbitration may be ordered when the arbitration
agreement is silent if it would serve efficiency and equity, and would not result in
prejudice."'' 35
The court then discussed the impact of arbitration in the context of mandatory
arbitration. The court reasoned that if it "enforced a mandatory, adhesive
arbitration clause, but prohibited class actions in arbitration where the agreement
is silent, the drafting party could effectively prevent class actions against it
without having to say it was doing so in the agreement.' 36 Further, if class-wide
arbitration was prohibited, those with "nominal individual claims, but significant
collective claims, would be left with no avenue for relief and the drafting party
with no check on its abuses of the law."'
137
The court then turned its attention to reviewing the conduct of the arbitrator
during the Bazzle and Lackey arbitrations. The court noted that while by South
Carolina law a trial court has the discretion to certify a class with the appellate
standard of review being abuse of discretion, 138 the permissible scope of review
for arbitral decisions is not so broad. 39 On the issue of review of an arbitrator's
decision, the United States Supreme Court has held that "if an arbitrator acted
even arguably within the scope of his authority, even a serious error on his part
does not warrant overturning his decision."' 140 The Fourth Circuit's interpretation
of Section 10 of the FAA 14' found that for an arbitrator to exceed his power and
128. Id. (quoting 9 U.S.C. § 4 (1999)).
129. Blue Cross, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
130. Id.
131. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
132. Id.
133. Keating, 645 P.2d at 1208-09.
134. Blue Cross, 78 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 793.
135. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 361.
138. Id. (citing Tilley v. Pacesetter Corp., 508 S.E.2d 16 (1998)).
139. Id.
140. Id. (citing Major League Baseball Players Assoc. v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 1015 (2001)).
141. 9 U.S.C. § 10 (2002) provides the grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award. An arbitrator's
award may only be overturned where "(1) the award was procured by corruption, fraud, or undue
means; (2) there was evident partiality or corruption in the arbitrators; (3) the arbitrators were guilty of
misconduct in refusing to postpone a hearing, or in refusing to hear pertinent evidence, or any other
misconduct by which parties' rights have been prejudiced; or (4) the arbitrators exceeded their powers,
or so imperfectly executed them that a mutual, final, and definite award upon the subject matter
submitted was not made." Id.
12
Journal of Dispute Resolution, Vol. 2003, Iss. 1 [2003], Art. 13
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/jdr/vol2003/iss1/13
Silent Treatment
have his decision overturned, he must act with "manifest disregard for the law.
' ' 42
Based upon the limited basis of review set forth by these courts, the South
Carolina Supreme Court upheld the awards in the Bazzle and Lackey suits. 143 The
court found that since there was no established law for the arbitrator to follow at
the time of the arbitrations, the arbitrator did not act with manifest disregard for
the law, and there was no basis for overturning the decisions.
44
D. Due Process Concerns
Green Tree and the Amici argued that the due process rights of the absent
class members had been violated by the resolution of the dispute as a class-wide
arbitration.14 5  The plaintiffs, however, claimed that adequate notice had been
given so each class member's rights were protected. 46 The court did not directly
address the issue, finding that the issue had not been raised before and could not
be raised for the first time on appeal. 147 Notwithstanding, the court indicated that
it could find no evidence that the absent class members' due process rights had
been violated, as it found the notice to be in compliance with the standard set by
the United States Supreme Court in Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts.1
48
V. COMMENT
With a split between the federal and state courts, and the addition of South
Carolina to the list of states following the minority view, 149 the status of class-
action arbitration remains unclear. The absence of a union between the class
action and arbitration has proven to present an outcome resulting in a less than
desirable result for the consumer, and a strategic avenue for businesses to limit
their liability through a material omission that some courts will allow. Thus
consumers are left at risk of losing one of the tools available to successfully take
on big business.
Class action is a useful tool that consumers can use to seek relief where it
would not be practical to do so as an individual.' 50 For a group of consumers with
small individual claims and limited individual resources, a class action suit may
present the best option, and possibly the only feasible option, for recovery from a
larger, more sophisticated opponent.' 5' By pooling resources and consolidating
common claims, not only does it become more practical for the consumers to
142. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 361 (citing Gallus Investments, L.P. v. Pudgie's Famous Chicken, Ltd.,
134 F.3d 231 (4th Cir. 1998)).
143. Id.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 362.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. 472 U.S. 797 (1985) (holding that descriptive notice sent by first-class mail to each class
member with an explanation of the right to opt-out fully satisfied due process).
149. The minority view allows class arbitration when the arbitration agreement is silent.
150. Jerold S. Solovy, Patricia Lee Refo & Ruth A. Bahe-Jachna, Class Action Controversies, 499
PLI/Lit 7, 40 (1994).
151. Kenneth S. Canfield, Advantages and Disadvantages of Class Actions from a Plaintiffs Lawyer's
Perspective, 28 SUM Brief 58, 61 (Summer 1999).
2003]
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bring suit, but it also makes it easier for a lawyer to expend the time and effort it
takes to bring this type of suit successfully.1 52 Defendants, on the other hand,
commonly oppose the class action, fearing negative publicity, excessive litigation
costs, and sky-high punitive damages.' 53 The issue of class certification is a
pivotal point in the litigation. For consumers, the claim may not be viable if class
certification is denied. 154 On the other hand, a grant of class certification may
cause defendants to feel pressured into settling for a substantial sum of money,
without regard to the validity of the plaintiffs' claims.
155
Arbitration is a method of alternative dispute resolution that offers parties a
chance to avoid the courtroom, yet solve a dispute in a manner that has a binding
effect. 5 6 It is usually quicker, cheaper, and more private than solving the dispute
in the courtroom. 157 In 1925, Congress enacted the Federal Arbitration Act to
abrogate the traditional hesitancy by courts to enforce arbitration agreements by
making arbitration agreements which fall within its scope specifically
enforceable. 58 Since the enactment of the FAA, the United States Supreme Court
has reinforced this notion and federal courts have followed its lead. 59 Today,
courts routinely enforce arbitration agreements, many times without regard to the
manner in which the agreement was reached or the relative bargaining power of
the parties. 160
As a result, businesses have devised a way to use the arbitration clause as a
shield from the dangers and pitfalls of a class action.' 6' Arbitration clauses have
increasingly become the favored way to avoid litigation since the potential for
class action litigation is significantly reduced if the consumers have agreed to
arbitrate their disputes. 162 This avenue of avoidance becomes even more attractive
when a majority of courts interpret the FAA to mean that parties must expressly
consent to class-wide arbitration or consolidation before it will be allowed to
proceed.163 Behind closed doors, defendants readily concede that "arbitration can
be used to deter the filing of a class action suit, or secure dismissal of a class
action that was nonetheless brought."'
64
There is concern by some scholars that this use of arbitration will hurt the
consumer. When an arbitration clause is freely negotiated between two parties
with equal bargaining power, arbitration can be a very fair and effective way to
152. Id.
153. Kaplinsky, supra n. 3, at 25.
154. Canfield, supra n. 151, at 60.
t55. Sternlight, supra n. 2, at 7.
156. Janet M. Grossnickle, Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson: How the Federal Arbitration Act
Will Keep Consumers and Corporations out of the Courtroom, 36 B.C. L. Rev. 769, 770 (1995).
157. Id.
158. Am. Centennial Ins. Co. v. Natl. Cas. Co., 951 F.2d at 108. See also Larry J. Pittman, The
Federal Arbitration Act: The Supreme Court's Erroneous Statutory Interpretation, Stare Decisis, and a
Proposal for Change, 53 Ala. L. Rev. 789 (2002).
159. Dean Witter Reynolds, 470 U.S. at 221.
160. Stemlight, supra n. 2, at 55.
161. Edward Wood Dunham, The Arbitration Clause as Class Action Shield, 16 Fran. L. J. 141
(Spring 1997).
162. Kaplinsky & Levin, supra n. 3, at 25.
163. Id.
164. Sternlight, supra n. 2, at 9.
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minimize costs and expedite resolution of a dispute. 165 However, in the consumer
arena, it is often the case that the arbitration clause is presented to the consumer
on a take it or leave it basis; it is not freely negotiated nor does the consumer have
an opportunity to take issue with any of the provisions.' 66 The Bazzle court
recognized this problem, and refused to allow it:
If we enforced a mandatory, adhesive arbitration clause, but prohibited
class actions in arbitration where the agreement is silent, the drafting
party could effectively prevent class actions against it without having to
say it was doing so in the agreement. Following the federal approach
risks such a result where arbitration is mandated through an un-
negotiated adhesion contract. Under those circumstances, parties with
nominal individual claims, but significant collective claims, would be left
with no avenue for relief and the drafting party with no check on its
abuses of the law. 167
The Pennsylvania Superior Court reinforced this sentiment in Dickler v.
Shearson, Lehman, Hutton, Inc.:
Given the three paths down which this litigation can be directed--
compelled individual arbitration, class action in a court of law, or
compelled classwide arbitration--the last choice best serves the dual
interest of respecting and advancing contractually agreed upon arbitration
agreements while allowing individuals who believe they have been
wronged to have an economically feasible route to get injunctive relief
from large institutions employing adhesion contracts. 168
It appears as though courts will continue to allow businesses to use the silent
treatment as a means to preclude class arbitration. The rule of strict adherence to
the language of the arbitration clause does not seem to trouble the majority of
courts. But in a concurring opinion to the Seventh Circuit decision in Champ v.
Siegel Trading Co., 69 Judge Rovner noted that "[c]lass certification is a matter
that parties rarely, if ever, speak to in their contracts, even when they have made
other provisions for the resolution of potential disputes."' 170  She further opined
that:
165. Grossnickle, supra n. 156, at 770-71.
166. See generally Cohen v. Wedbush, Noble, Cooke, Inc., 841 F.2d 282 (9th Cir. 1988) (arbitration
clause is not invalid simply because it is part of an adhesion contract.); Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson
Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20 (1991) (inequality of bargaining power alone will not invalidate an arbitration
agreement); Harris v. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 183 F.3d 173 (3d Cir.1999) (same). But see Szetala v.
Discover Bank, 118 Cal. Rptr. 2d 862, 867 (2002).
167. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d 360-61.
168. Dickler, 596 A.2d at 867.
169. 55 F.3d 269 (7th Cir. 1995) (holding that unless the agreement expressly allows for class
arbitration the court cannot grant class certification. Judge Rovner concurred with the result, reasoning
that Fed. R. Civ. P. 23 applied to judicial proceedings related to arbitration, not to the arbitration
itself).
170. Id. at 277.
20031
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[P]ractically speaking, [it is doubtful that] class certification is something
that corporate defendants who draft these agreements for their clients to
sign would ever consent to in writing; they typically have far more to
gain by forcing the unhappy customer to bear the expense of arbitrating
individually. 171
VI. CONCLUSION
Consumers hope that Bazzle signifies a bold resistence to the federal trend.
Although the majority of courts that have faced the issue have interpreted Section
4 of the FAA to mean that in the absence of express language, class-wide
arbitration is not allowed, 172 Bazzle adds yet another voice to the minority seeking
to protect the consumer. In Bazzle and Lackey, the FAA applied but the court
chose to side with the position of the California courts.' 7 3 Not only did the court
consider the analogy to consolidation of cases, but the court also looked to the
agreement itself, found ambiguity, and applied the well-established contract
principle of construing ambiguity against the drafter.174 This approach may offer
other courts a way to reason around barring a class from proceeding in arbitration.
Additionally, as states adopt the Revised Uniform Arbitration Act which only
bars consolidation of arbitration proceedings when the agreement prohibits it,
perhaps the analogy between consolidation and class certification will reflect this
change. Thus, the analogy may be drawn to allow consumers to obtain class
certification even if the arbitration agreement does not address it, 17 5 precluding
businesses from silently removing the class action from the consumer's arsenal.
For the sake of the consumer class action, let's hope so.
ANDREA LOCKRIDGE
171. Id.
172. See Champ, 55 F.3d at 275.
173. Bazzle, 569 S.E.2d at 360.
174. Id. at 359.
175. See supra n. 79.
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